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CVE-2019-19687: OpenStack Keystone Credentials API...

freebuf 2019-12-12 594 0

本文来源:京东云安全

0x00 概述

近期，国外研究员Daniel 'f0o' Preussker报告了OpenStack组件Keystone Credentials API中的一处缺陷。当Keystone 的部署配置中将enforce_scope设置为False时，list credentials接口的相关过滤操作失效，导致在操作的project中拥有角色的用户可以获取该project下的所有用户credentials，造成信息泄露。

0x01 影响范围

Keystone = 15.0.0 and =16.0.0

0x02 漏洞修复

相关修复代码已经合并到主分支，详见Commit。

0x03 漏洞分析

该漏洞产生的源于将enforce_scope的配置值引入了凭据结果过滤的操作判断逻辑中，当其取False时造成对应处理逻辑绕过，进而造成信息泄露。补丁的修复也是对该部分逻辑进行了变更，详细如下：

        # /keystone/api/credentials.py         def _list_credentials(self):         filters = ['user_id', 'type']         if not self.oslo_context.system_scope:             target = {'credential': {'user_id': self.oslo_context.user_id}}         else:             target = None         ENFORCER.enforce_call(action='identity:list_credentials',                               filters=filters, target_attr=target)         hints = self.build_driver_hints(filters)         refs = PROVIDERS.credential_api.list_credentials(hints)          # If the request was filtered, make sure to return only the         # credentials specific to that user. This makes it so that users with         # roles on projects can't see credentials that aren't theirs. -        if (not self.oslo_context.system_scope and -                CONF.oslo_policy.enforce_scope):  -            filtered_refs = [] -            for ref in refs: -                if ref['user_id'] == target['credential']['user_id']: -                    filtered_refs.append(ref) -            refs = filtered_refs +        filtered_refs = [] +        for ref in refs: +            # Check each credential again to make sure the user has access to +            # it, either by owning it, being a project admin with +            # enforce_scope=false, being a system user, or having some other +            # custom policy that allows access. +            try: +                cred = PROVIDERS.credential_api.get_credential(ref['id']) +                ENFORCER.enforce_call( +                    action='identity:get_credential', +                    target_attr={'credential': cred} +                ) +                filtered_refs.append(ref) +            except exception.Forbidden: +                pass +       refs = filtered_refs         refs = [self._blob_to_json(r) for r in refs]         return self.wrap_collection(refs, hints=hints)

漏洞成因较为简单，但可以借此一窥Keystone API以及OpenStak背后的一些底层组件以及处理逻辑：

Oslo 维护了一套公共库，实现了OpenStack各项目中用到的共有功能，避免了各项目重复造轮子。产生本次漏洞的enforce_scope选项即为其中的oslo_policy所需的配置项，该库为OpenStack各项目中基于角色的访问控制(RBAC: Role-Based Access Control）功能提供实施策略的支持。具体地，enforce_scope对应于请求验证过程中对特定异常处理的控制（请求与scope_type允许范围不匹配时，抛出异常或记日志）。

oslo.policy通过以下两个类实现各项功能支持：

oslo_policy.policy.RuleDefault: 用于定义检查策略/规则。
oslo_policy.policy.Enforcer : 负责加载和执行规则/策略

这两个类也对应oslo.policy的两个入口点：oslo.policy.policies和oslo.policy.enforcer

当服务发起一定操作时，由Enforce加载并执行Policy，完成对操作的鉴权和访问控制。

如下为Credentials API中list_credentials的一个oslo_policy.policy.DocumentedRuleDefault(继承RuleDefault)实例，记录了一个policy enforcement的相关策略：

 policy.DocumentedRuleDefault(         name=base.IDENTITY % 'list_credentials',         check_str=base.SYSTEM_READER_OR_CRED_OWNER,         scope_types=['system', 'project'],  # scope of the operation         description='List credentials.',         operations=[{'path': '/v3/credentials',                      'method': 'GET'}],         deprecated_rule=deprecated_list_credentials,         deprecated_reason=DEPRECATED_REASON,         deprecated_since=versionutils.deprecated.STEIN     ),

其中: